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THE SCOPE OF THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL
QUALIFICATION EXEMPTION UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
EEOC v. City of Janesville
630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980)
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act' makes it unlawful
for employers, employment agencies and labor organizations to dis-
criminate on the basis of age against persons between the ages of 40
and 70 when making hiring decisions or when setting policies with re-
spect to retirement or terms of employment. 2 The Act is intended to
promote the employment of older workers by prohibiting decisions
made on the basis of arbitrary age limits, without regard to the particu-
lar worker's ability to perform the job in question. 3 However, excep-
tions are provided for in the ADEA, allowing the use of age as a,
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the ADEA or the
Act].
2. Id. § 623(a)-(d) (1976). The Act also prohibits advertising for employment in a manner
which indicates a preference based solely on age. Id. § 623(e) (1976).
As originally passed, the ADEA's protections extended only to workers between the ages of
40 and 65. Id. § 631 (1976). However, the 1978 amendments raised the upper age limit to 70
years of age. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979)).
For the definition of employers, employment agencies and labor organizations covered by the
Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1976).
The ADEA in general parallels the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which prohibit discrimination because of
race, sex, religion or national origin. For a general survey of the ADEA's provisions, see C.
EDIELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: SLOWING
DOWN THE GOLDEN WATCH (1979) [hereinafter cited as EDELMAN]; 4 A. LARSON & K. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 98.00-103.80 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; 17 AM. Bus.
LJ. 363 (1979); Note, TheAge Discrimination in EmploymentAct f1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]; Note, Age Discrimination in Employment Suits.- A Practical
Guide, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 503 (1979); Note, The Cost of Growing Old" Business Necessity and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) states the Act's purpose:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance
has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work
to the disadvantage of older persons;
(b) It'is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment.
For further declarations of the intent of Congress in passing the ADEA, see H.R. REP. No.
805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. [1967], reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213; S. RE'.
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criterion in employment decisions in certain circumstances. 4 One of
these exceptions is the bona fide occupational qualification exemption,
which allows an employer to "take any action otherwise prohibited" by
the Act if "age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the particular business." 5
Courts construing the bfoq exemption have found its language less
than clear. But there is little to guide them either in the Act's legislative
history or the administrative interpretations of the ADEA. 6 Those
courts which have addressed the question of how the bfoq exemption is
to be applied in age discrimination cases have generally turned to case
law interpreting the similar language of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19647 for guidance. Most of these courts have applied an inter-
pretation set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit under Title VIIs to ADEA cases. This interpretation imposes a
No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 119781, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504
(report on the 1978 amendments).
A pertinent comment was made by Representative Burke during the congressional debates:
Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimination based on race or
creed prejudices and bigotry. These discriminations result in nonemployment because of
feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to do a job. This is hardly a
problem for the older jobseeker. Discrimination arises for him because of assumptions
that are made about the effects of age on performance.
113 CONG. REc. 34742 (1967). See also The President's Message on Older Americans, Pua. PA-
PERs 32 (Jan. 23, 1967) (recommending the ADEA to Congress).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
5. Id. § 623(f)(1) (1976). [The bona fide occupational qualification exception is hereinafter
referred to as the bfoq.] Title VII contains similar language, permitting otherwise prohibited prac-
tices where religion, sex or national origin is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1976).
6. For a discussion of the scarcity of comment on the bfoq in the ADEA's legislative history,
see James & Alaimo, BFOQ." An Exception Becoming the Rule, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REY. 1, 9 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as James & Alaimo].
For the interpretations of the bfoq given by the Department of Labor, the original enforcing
agency, see 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1980). The EEOC, now the agency charged with enforcement of
the Act, has issued proposed guidelines which have not yet been formally adopted. See Proposed
Interpretations; Age Discrimination in Employment, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Proposed Interpretations]. Out see the EEOC bulletin regarding the bfoq under Tide VII, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1980).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). See note 5 supra. In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584
(1978), the Supreme Court noted that "the [substantive] prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in
haec verba from Title VII." Many courts, noting the similarities in language and purpose between
Title VII and the ADEA, have declared that the two statutes are to be construed consistently with
each other. See, e.g., Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 416 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Mich. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 908 (1980). This assumption
has been made, implicitly if not explicitly, in the cases discussed below, adopting in ADEA cases a
standard applied to the bfoq provisions of Title VII.
For a discussion of the relationship between the two statutes, see Harvard Note, supra note 2,
at 411, which suggests that, because of significant differences between age discrimination and the
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the ADEA and Title VII should not be applied in the same
manner in all circumstances.
8. The leading cases are Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
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heavy burden on an employer seeking to justify an asserted bfoq.9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has
declined to adopt this interpretation in ADEA cases, preferring a less
stringent standard.' 0
The Seventh Circuit first enunciated its standard in Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc. ,I where the court held that a mere good faith
belief by an employer was sufficient to justify the use of age as the
determining factor in employment decisions. 12 The Seventh Circuit re-
cently confronted a second ADEA case in which the employer asserted
a bfoq to justify an employment policy based solely on age. In EEOC
v. City of Janesville,13 the Wisconsin city argued that its mandatory
retirement policy for employees of the police department came under
the bfoq exception to the Act. The essence of the city's argument was
that since the employees carrying out the primary function of the police
department could lawfully be forced to retire at a certain age because
of the physical demands of their work, all employees of the department
could be forced to retire at that age, regardless of their particular jobs.14
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (sex discrimination; airline's policy of hiring only females for job
of flight attendant held unlawful), and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969) (sex discrimination; defendant's refusal to hire women for job of switchman held un-
lawful). The adaptation of these cases to the provisions of the ADEA is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 27-91 ofra. For a discussion of these cases and the bfoq under Title VII
generally, see I LARSON, supra note 2, ch. 4; Sirota, Sex Discrimination" Title VII and the Bona
Fide Occupational Qualrcadon, 55 Tax. L. REv. 1025 (1977).
9. Weeks and Diaz are to be read together, according to the court which decided the cases.
See Usery v. Tamiani Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 45-58 nf/ra. Taken together, these cases require the defendant to satisfy a two-part
test to justify an asserted bfoq. Under Diaz, the defendant must show that the bfoq is a matter of
business necessity; that is, that the essence of its business will be undermined if the bfoq is disal-
lowed. 442 F.2d at 388. Thus, in Diaz, the airline did not prevail on its bfoq defense when it
could only demonstrate that the practice of hiring exclusively women for the position of flight
attendant was a matter of business convenience. Id. Under Weeks, the second part of the test
requires the defendant to demonstrate that either there is reasonable cause-a factual basis-for
believing that substantially all members of the plaintiff's sex would be unable to perform the
duties of the job involved, or that because there is no practical manner to determine the fitness of
each individual of that sex, the general proscription must be used. 408 F.2d at 235. In Weeks, the
defendant failed to show that its policy was based on anything but stereotypes, and its bfoq de-
fense failed. Id.
10. Courts have generally applied to the ADEA the maxim that a remedial statute is to be
interpreted liberally to effectuate its purposes. See, e.g., Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525
F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975); Sartin v. City of Columbus Utils. Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Miss.
1976). A corollary of this proposition is that the exceptions provided for in such a statute are to be
construed narrowly. See Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1981); 29
C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1980); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 6, at 68,861. Cf. Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (Title VII case; bfoq exception to Title VII was meant to be
an "extremely narrow exception").
11. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
12. The case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 28-46 and notes 98-103 infra.
13. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
14. The defendant's argument is set forth in the district court opinion in this case; see EEOC
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In accepting this argument, the Janesville court is in direct conffict with
other courts deciding bfoq cases on essentially similar facts. Further,
the Seventh Circuit in Janesville gives the ADEA bfoq exemption an
interpretation so broad as to undermine the purposes of the Act.
The reasoning of the Janesville court is largely an outgrowth of the
decision in Greyhound, in which the Seventh Circuit first indicated its
willingness to give a broad interpretation to the ADEA bfoq. Before
discussing the Janesville opinion, therefore, it is important to place the
Greyhound decision in the context of the case law on the bfoq. A re-
view of the cases will underline the contrast between the Seventh Cir-
cuit's interpretation and the narrower approach generally taken by
other courts. It will also reveal how other courts have dealt with issues
which arose in Janesville. The Janesville opinion can then be analyzed
against this background.
THE BFOQ EXEMPTION
A major aim of the ADEA is to prevent age-based stereotyping. t 5
It generally prohibits employers from relying solely on age as an indi-
cator of ability in making hiring, retirement or discharge decisions in-
volving workers within the protected class.
16
However, the bona fide occupational qualification exception 7 rec-
ognizes that age, at times, may be the most significant criterion by
which to judge an individual's fitness for a particular job. Since this
exception, unlike the others provided for in the Act,18 permits the em-
v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (W.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir.
1980).
15. See note 3 supra for text of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976). See also the legislative materials
cited in note 3 supra.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976) sets out the prohibited "employer practices." The Act also
applies to employment agencies and labor organizations. Id. § 623(b)-(e).
The protected class includes all persons between the ages of 40 and 70 working for or apply-
ing for a job with an employer, in an industry affecting commerce, which has 20 or more employ-
ees for twenty or more weeks of the year. Id. §§ 630, 631 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
17. Id. § 623(0(1) (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer...-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under . .. this [Act] where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business.
18. The other exceptions in the Act are as follows:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer...-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under. . . this [Act] . . . where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age;
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall ex-
cuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit
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ployer to rely solely on age, and therefore allows the very age-based
employment policies the ADEA was designed to prevent,' 9 it presents
an important question of interpretation. If construed too broadly, this
exception could swallow the rule.
This potential has been recognized both by the Department of La-
bor, originally charged with enforcement of the Act,20 and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,2' which is now the enforcing
agency.22 The interpretative bulletins issued by both indicate in gen-
eral language that the bfoq exemption is to be construed narrowly,
23
with the burden on the party asserting it to justify the use of age as an
indicator of ability.24 But beyond these very general guidelines, there is
little in the interpretative bulletins25 or in the Act's legislative history
26
plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual [protected by
the Act] because of the age of such individual; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Id. § 623(f)(I)-(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
19. See, e.g., Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978): "Es-
tablishment of a BFOQ may, in some cases, permit an employer to discriminate along otherwise
illegal lines without reference to an individual's actual physical condition." See also the comment
to the same effect in EEOC v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd,
630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980): "Because the 'bona fide occupational qualification' exemption frees
an employer from the ADEA's general requirement that he make an individual judgment about
an older worker's ability, it embodies the risk of permitting on a broad scale the very age stere-
otyping which the ADEA was passed to prevent."
20. As originally enacted, the ADEA provided for enforcement according to the terms of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216, 217 (1976). See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976).
Section 21 l(b) vests the power to enforce the Act in the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator
of the Wage & Hour Division of the Department of Labor.
21. Hereinafter referred to as the EEOC.
22. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978), transferred the enforcement func-
tions under the ADEA from the Department of Labor to the EEOC, effective July 1, 1979. See
aso Exec. Order No. 12,144, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193 (1979).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1980), the Department of Labor bulletin, provides:
Whether occupational qualifications will be deemed to be "bona fide" and "reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business," will be determined on
the basis of all the pertinent facts surrounding each particular situation. It is anticipated
that this concept of a bona fide occupational qualification will have limited scope and
application.
Id. § 860.102(b). The EEOC bulletin uses the same language. See Proposed Interpretations,
supra note 6, at 68,861.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1980) declares:
[A]s this is an exception, it must be construed narrowly, and the burden of proof in
establishing that it applies is the responsibility of the employer. . which relies upon it.
The EEOC bulletin uses identical language. See Proposed Interpretations, supra note 6, at 68,861.
25. Beyond the language quoted in notes 23 & 24 supra, the Department of Labor bulletin
gives few examples of what constitutes a bfoq: age limitations, without reference to the physical
condition of the individual, when such limitations are "clearly imposed for the safety and conven-
ience of the public," such as Federal Aviation Agency age limits for carrier pilots; actors required
for youthful or elderly characterizations; and persons used to advertise products directed at a
particular age group. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.102(d)-(e) (1980). These examples have been deleted from
the EEOC bulletin.
26. One of the few comments made on the point during the congressional consideration of
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to aid the courts in determining when age is a bona fide occupational
qualification or when a bfoq is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business. ' 27 It is not surprising, then, that
judicial interpretation of the bfoq exemption has resulted in different
standards among the circuits regarding both the scope of the exception
and the burden of proof borne by the party asserting it.
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to face
the question. In Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. ,28 the Department
of Labor brought suit under the ADEA to challenge the bus company's
hiring policy, which set an upper age limit of 35 for new drivers.29
Greyhound claimed that youth was a bfoq and argued that to eliminate
the upper age limit would increase the risk of harm to its passengers
because of the manner in which the company assigned hours and
routes to drivers. 30 The district court ruled against Greyhound, hold-
ing that the defendant had failed to meet its burden of proof on the
bfoq issue.31 To define this burden, the lower court had used the stan-
dard enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in a Title VII bfoq case, Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.32 As applied in Greyhound,
the Weeks standard required the defendant to demonstrate that there
was "reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing,
that all or substantially all" persons over 35 would prove to be unsafe
drivers.33 The Seventh Circuit held this to be an inappropriate test on
the Act is contained in H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), reprintedin [1967] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2220, where the House Committee on Education and Labor
stated: "It is, of course, not the purpose of this legislation to require the employment, regardless of
age, of one not otherwise qualified." For a further discussion of the ADEA's legislative history,
see James & Alaimo, supra note 6; Harvard Note, supra note 2.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (Supp. III 1979).
28. 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
29. The complaint alleged violations of § 623(a)(1), for refusing to hire because of age; of
§ 623(a)(2), for classifying employees in a manner which deprives them of employment opportuni-
ties because of age; and of§ 623(e), for advertising in a manner which indicates a preference based
on age. 499 F.2d at 860. Note that since the ADEA protects persons older than 40, the policy
challenged in Greyhound would only be illegal under the Act with respect to applicants aged 40 or
older. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. III 1979).
30. 499 F.2d at 861. New drivers were assigned "extra-board work" which involved 24-hour
call, seven days a week, with as little as two hours' notice before a trip. Along with odd and
irregular hours, this duty involved trips which frequently lasted up to 30 days. The less strenuous,
more regular routes were assigned on the basis of seniority, and a driver could spend more than
ten years on the "extra-board" before being assigned to a regular run. Id. at 864.
31. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 239 (N.D. IMI. 1973).
32. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (sex discrimination case; held, being male not a bfoq for job
of switchman).
33. 354 F. Supp. at 236. After citing Wee/cs, the district court stated: "The question thus
arises as to whether Greyhound has established a 'factual basis' for its belief that applicants be-
tween the ages of 40 and 65 would be unable to perform safely the duties of an extra-board
driver." Id.
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the facts before it, since the issue in Greyhound centered around the
safety of the bus passengers and other highway motorists, rather than,
as in Weeks, the welfare of the individual job applicant.34 In other
words, the court considered the Weeks test too stringent where public
safety was a concern. A better approach, the court declared, was that
taken by the Fifth Circuit in another Title VII case, Diaz v. Pan Ameri-
can WorldAirways, Inc. ,35 where the question was framed in terms of a
business necessity test: Would the essence of the defendant's business
be undermined if the bfoq were disallowed?36 Greyhound's business is
the safe transportation of passengers by bus. The court said that since
one goal is safety, the company must strive to employ the most highly
qualified drivers.37 Citing Spurlock v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc. ,38 a Tenth
Circuit Title VII case, the court then stated that where public safety is
concerned, the burden on the defendant to justify a bfoq eases some-
what 3 9 though the defendant must still demonstrate a rational basis for
the challenged policy.40
The court was satisfied that Greyhound's policy had a rational ba-
sis. Evidence submitted at trial4 l showed that the upper age limit was
based on a good faith belief that the safety of passengers could only be
assured by this means.42 This, the court held, was sufficient to justify a
34. 499 F.2d at 861.
35. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (sex discrimination case; held,
being female not a bfoq for job of flight attendant).
36. Id. at 388 (cited in Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 862). In applying Diaz to the facts before it,
the Greyhound court stated: "mhe essence of Greyhound's business is the safe transportation of
its passengers. Thus, we deem it necessary that Greyhound establish that the essence of its opera-
tions would be endangered by hiring drivers over forty years of age." Id.
37. Id. at 863.
38. 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972). Spurlock was a race discrimination case brought under
Title VII against the airline, alleging that the airline's employment standards were discriminatory,
since few blacks were employed as pilots. The Spurlock court stated that in cases such as the one
before it, "courts... should proceed with great caution before requiring an employer to lower his
preemployment standards" where the job requires a high degree of skill and the risks to persons
and property involved are great. Id. at 219.
39. 499 F.2d at 863.
40. In the court's words:
Greyhound must demonstrate that it has a rational basis in fact to believe that elimina-
tion of its maximum hiring age will increase the likelihood of risk of harm to passengers.
Greyhound need only demonstrate however a minimal increase in risk of harm for it is
enough to show that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one
more person...
Id. But see the standard applied by the district court in-this case. See also note 33 supra.
41. 499 F.2d at 863-65. Greyhound presented testimony of industry officials on the use of an
age limitation such as Greyhound's, but the court found this alone to be insufficient to support the
asserted bfoq. Id. at 863. More convincing was the evidence regarding the rigors of extra-board
work, the physical changes brought about by aging, and statistics showing that Greyhound's safest
drivers were between 50 and 55 years of age with between 16 and 20 years of experience. Id.
42. Id. at 865. But see the conclusion of the district court:
"Good basic common sense" does not suffice as "objective data" to satisfy the "factual
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bfoq, and Greyhound's hiring policy was allowed to stand.43
Thus, it was enough for the Greyhound court that the employer
could demonstrate that its hiring policy was not the result of an arbi-
trary belief which totally lacked an objective reason or rationale.44 The
Seventh Circuit interpreted the test applied by the district court in Grey-
hound to mean that a defendant must demonstrate to a certainty that
the reasons or assumptions underlying the policy were in fact true for
every applicant. 45 Where public safety was an issue, the court declared,
this test was too strict. It was enough that the employer's policy was
based on a good faith belief as to its necessity.46
Two years after Greyhound, the Fifth Circuit was faced with a case
involving essentially the same facts. In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc. ,47 the Labor Department brought suit under the ADEA to chal-
lenge a bus company's 40-year upper age limit for new drivers. 48 The
defendant in this case also asserted that its policy came within the bfoq
exemption to the Act.49 Like the trial court in Greyhound, the lower
court in Tamiami used the standard set forth in Weeks in determining
whether the defendant had met its burden of proof on the issue, but in
this case held that the exception had been justified.50 In affirming the
basis" of the Weeks decision. Nor has defendant had any experience with applicants
above age 40 so that it could factually state that such drivers would have the highest
number of accidents....
[Tihe data prepared by the defendant and the evidence it has presented [have not
demonstrated] that its policy of age limitation is reasonably necessary to the normal and
safe operation of its business nor that age is a bona fide occupational qualification within
the meaning of the Act.
354 F. Supp. at 238-39.
43. 499 F.2d at 865.
44. Id.
45. The appellate court disagreed, explaining that "Greyhound need not establish its belief to
the certainty demanded by. . .the district court for to do so would effectively require Greyhound
to go so far as to experiment with the lives of its passengers in order to produce statistical evi-
dence." Id.
46. The Seventh Circuit felt that "Greyhound has amply demonstrated that its.., policy is
founded upon a good faith judgment concerning the safety needs of its passengers and others. It
has established that its hiring policy is not the result of an arbitrary belief lacking in objective
reason or rationale." Id.
47. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. The Labor Department alleged violations of 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1) and 623(e) (1976),
based upon the bus company's refusal to hire individuals over the age of 40 and its practices of
specifying that age limit in its advertisements. 531 F.2d at 227 n.2.
There were eight complaining witnesses involved, ranging in age from 41 to 57. The defend-
ant claimed that six were refused employment because of factors other than age, but it admitted
that the other two were turned away simply because they were over 40. Id. at 227 & nn.3 & 4.
49. The defense was essentially the same as that in Greyhound, the defendant asserting that




decision, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question whether the Weeks
standard was appropriate where public safety was a concern.5 I Noting
that it felt the Seventh Circuit had misapprehended the standard set
forth in Weeks and Diaz, 52 the Tamiami court elaborated on the ra-
tionale of Weeks and Diaz and explained their application in ADEA
cases. The Diaz business-necessity test was not exclusive of the Weeks
substantial-factual-basis approach, as the Greyhound court had sug-
gested. Rather, the court said, Diaz and Weeks set forth two elements
of one standard.53 The defendant must show that the asserted bfoq is
essential to its business.54 Having done so, the defendant must also
demonstrate that there is a substantial factual basis for believing that
substantially all applicants over 40 would prove to be unsafe drivers, or
that there is no practical basis other than age by which to ascertain an
applicant's passenger-endangering characteristics. 55
In Tamiami, the court held that the defendant had met the first
part of its burden-showing a business necessity--since the purpose of
the policy in question was to assure the safety of its passengers, un-:
doubtedly essential to its business.56 Further, the second part of the test
had been satisfied, although the defendant could not demonstrate a fac-
tual basis for its judgment that all applicants over age 40 would be
unsafe drivers.57 Tamiami did show to the court's satisfaction that
51. Id. at 234-37.
52. Id. at 235 n.27. The court also questioned Greyhound's reliance on Spurlock v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), which, it pointed out, dealt not with a bfoq defense
but an unrelated question, the requirement under Title VII that employment criteria be job-re-
lated, a standard defined in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Tamiami court
said that this distinction is crucial
[b]ecause, although the indefinite nature of the common law job-relatedness test may
necessitate the imposition of a lighter burden when the safety of third parties is impli-
cated, the Weeks-Diaz standard is more precise, applies to a narrow statutory defense,
and does not compel the hiring of unqualified job applicants.
531 F.2d at 236 n.28.
53. Id. at 235.
54. Id. The court noted here that it is this element of the two-part test which takes into
account the safety factor: "The greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and
the probable severity of that harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job
qualifications designed to insure safe driving," since the essence of the business in this case was
the safe transportation of bus passengers. Id. at 236.
55. Id. at 235-36. While the Greyhound court apparently felt that Weeks would require the
hiring of unqualified applicants, the Tamiami court stated that this was not the case: "On the
contrary, if all or substantially all members of a class do not qualify, or if there is no practical way
reliably to differentiate the qualified from the unqualified . . . , it is precisely then that Weeks
permits otherwise proscribed class discrimination as a BFOQ." Id. at 236. In other words, Weeks
does not require an employer to hire an unqualified applicant, but it does require the employer to
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there was no practical basis other than age on which to make such a
judgment for each applicant. 58 Thus, the use of the upper age limit was
justifed under the bfoq exemption to the ADEA and Tamiami's hiring
policy was allowed to stand.
59
Greyhound and Tamiami reach the same result, the employer's
age-based hiring policy being held lawful in both cases. But the more
rigorous analysis of the Tamiami court results in a heavier burden be-
ing imposed on the employer seeking to justify the use of age in its
employment policy. This approach is more in accord with the interpre-
tative bulletins declaring that the exemptions to the ADEA are to be
construed narrowly. 60 Both cases require the defendant to satisfy the
Diaz business-necessity standard. 6' Beyond that, however, Grey-
hound's "good faith belief' requirement is a broader standard than the
narrow, clearly defined factual-basis test adopted by the Tamiami
court. This has been the view, at least implicitly, of all courts subse-
quently faced with bfoq cases under the ADEA, none of which has
adopted the Greyhound rationale.
In Aaron v. Davis,62 a private suit was brought under the ADEA to
challenge the plaintiffs' forced retirement at age 62, an age limit set by
a city ordinance. The plaintiffs had been assistant chief and district
chief of a city fire department, and their duties had been largely super-
58. Id. at 238: "Whatever might have been our finding were we deciding the issue de novo,
the District Court found that examinations cannot detect the relevant physiological and psycho-
logical changes 'with sufficient reliability to meet the special safety obligations of motor carriers of
passengers.'"
59. Id. The court held that since the finding of fact by the district court was not clearly
erroneous, it could not be set aside.
In accord with Twn"ai is Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.
1978). Although this case was primarily concerned with the defendant's burden of proof under
the "reasonable factors other than age" exception, the Fifth Circuit did reiterate the reasoning of
Tamiami in commenting on the bfoq exception. Id. at 591.
60. See note 10 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 35 & 54 supra.
62. 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976). In Aaron, it was the employees themselves who
brought suit, not the Labor Department as in Greyhound and Tamam.i. Under 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)
& (d) (Supp. III 1979) (the provisions were substantially the same at the time of this suit), the
aggrieved party may bring a civil suit, subject to certain procedural requirements, including notice
to the enforcing agency. Should the enforcing agency institute a suit on the plaintiff's behalf after
he has brought suit in his own name, this terminates the private suit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (Supp.
III 1979). For a survey of the procedural aspects of the ADEA, see EDELMAN, supra note 2, at
137; 4 LARsoN, supra note 2, § 102.00; Sheeder, Procedural Complexity oftheAge Discrinination in
Employment Act: AnAge-OldProblem, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 241 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sheeder].
The plaintiffs in Aaron alleged violations of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976), averring that under
the ordinance they were discharged solely because of age. The complaint also contained a count
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and counts based on the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 414 F. Supp. at 456. The court declined to examine these
claims, finding the ADEA dispositive. Id. at 460.
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visory.6 3 The ordinance, however, mandated the retirement of all
members of the department, including department heads, at age 62.64
The defendants asserted a bfoq on the grounds of public safety, citing
Greyhound in support of their contention that they must only demon-
strate "a rational basis in fact to believe that the elimination of the
mandatory retirement provision would increase the. . risk of harm to
the public" and other firefighters.65 The court, however, characterized
as stereotyping the defendants' assumption that many or most depart-
ment employees would be physically unable to perform their duties be-
yond a certain age.66 The court also distinguished Greyhound, stating
that it differed "both in kind and degree" from the case before it.67
While agreeing that "the quantum of the showing" necessary to justify
a bfoq decreases when the job involved carries an inherent risk to the
public or fellow employees, the court further stated that there must still
be some empirical justification for the policy in question. 68 The de-
fendants' assumptions, based on stereotypes rather than any empirical
evidence, did not meet this burden, and the court struck down the ordi-
nance, calling it "arbitrary and capricious and wholly lacking in any
justifiable business necessity."
69
While the Aaron court did not expressly rely on Tamiami,70 it did
cite Weeks in support of its holding that there must be some empirical
justification for the policy asserted as a bfoq.71 It is clear that the court
was not satisfied with the standard set forth in Greyhound, which, it
said, called for a demonstration of a rational basis in fact underlying
the policy in question.72 The court apparently considered this a lesser
63. Id. at 456-57. It appears that even the department heads, however, were required at
times to take an active part in fighting fires. Id.
64. The ordinance provided: "Retirement from active employment for all members, includ-
ing department heads, of the fire department, shall be mandatory upon attaining the age of sixty-
two years .... 414 F. Supp. at 455 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 461.
66. Id. at 462.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 461:
[T]he quantum of the showing required of the employer is inversely proportional to
the degree and unavoidability of the risk to the public or fellow employees inherent in
the requirements and duties of the particular job. . . . But at no point will the law
permit. . . the fixing of a mandatory retirement age based entirely on hunch, intuition,
or stereotyping, i.e., without any empirical justification.
69. Id. at 463.
70. Tamiami was decided only a few weeks before Aaron.
71. 414 F. Supp. at 461.
72. Faced with a choice between Weeks and Greyhound, the Aaron court opted for the for-
mer, although stating that it was "of the opinion that it makes little difference in the result here
whether one. . . applies the Greyhound or the Weeks rule," because of the defendants' total lack
of empirical support for the policy. Id. at 462.
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burden than that set forth in Weeks.
The year following Aaron, the Eighth Circuit turned to Weeks and
Tamiami in deciding a bfoq case. In Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 73 a 52-year-old test pilot sued under the ADEA after he had
been removed from flight duty and subsequently discharged. 74 Mc-
Donnell Douglas conceded that the plaintiff had been removed from
flight duty solely because of age, a per se violaton of the Act.75 The
company had no set age policy on the transfer of test pilots to non-
flying positions, but made each decision individually.76 The defendant
asserted, however, that age was an appropriate criterion on which to
make the decision, due to the physiological and psychological changes
that accompany aging.77 In an opinion by Justice Clark, however, the
court held that the defendant had failed to meet its burden of proof on
73. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
The complete history of the Houghton case is one of the longer chapters of ADEA case law.
Shortly after Houghton filed his private suit in January, 1973, the Secretary of Labor filed suit
against McDonnell Douglas seeking prospective relief against the same discrimination alleged in
the private suit. The Secretary sought to have this suit consolidated with the private action, but
the district court dismissed the Secretary's suit as duplicative of the private action. A motion by
the Secretary to intervene in the private action was denied by the district court as untimely. On
appeal, the district court was reversed, and leave to intervene was allowed. Brennan v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 519 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1975).
On remand, the district court entered judgment for the defendant after trial, holding that
McDonnell Douglas had established age as a bfoq for the job of test pilot. Houghton v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 413 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mo. 1976). This decision was reversed by the Eighth
Circuit in the opinion discussed in the text. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561
(8th Cir. 1977). The defendant sought review of this holding by the United States Supreme Court,
but the Court declined to review the decision. 434 U.S. 966 (1977) (denying certiorari).
The case returned to the district court, which again entered judgment for the defendant, hold-
ing that additional evidence presented on remand demonstrated that Houghton had become phys-
ically unable to perform the duties of test pilot safely before he had been removed from flight
status, so that his removal and later discharge were not violations of the ADEA. 474 F. Supp. 193
(E.D. Mo. 1979). Houghton appealed, and the Eighth Circuit again reversed the district court,
holding that its decision in the previous appeal on the merits precluded the defendant from intro-
ducing additional evidence, that the plaintiff had established his right to back pay for the period
from 1972 to 1975, and that the previous opinion had ruled that plaintiff was entitled to this relief.
Judgment was ordered awarding back pay. The court also held that the plaintiff and the inter-
venor, now the EEOC, were entitled to attorneys' fees in all courts, but left the amount to be
determined by the district court. 627 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1980).
74. After Houghton was removed from flight duty in July, 1971, the company offered him
two other positions, which he refused because he considered them a step downward. He sought
employment with another company but was unsuccessful. Returning to his former position at
McDonnell Douglas, but without flight duty, he grew dissatisfied. He rejected an offer to join the
space shuttle simulator program and was finally discharged in December, 1972, for "nonproduc-
tivity." Id. at 563. In addition to his initial charge that his removal from flight duty violated the
ADEA, he added a claim that it was a constructive discharge. Id. at 564.
75. The company found it necessary to reduce its test pilot staff, and decided to do so by age.
Houghton, at 52 the oldest test pilot in the company's history, was removed from flight duty along




the bfoq issue, since its data on the effects of aging dealt with the gen-
eral population, rather than with test pilots in particular.78 In setting
forth the standard for the defendant's burden, the court relied on the
language of Weeks and Tamiami, making no mention of Greyhound.
79
The question whether Greyhound or Tamiami presents the better
approach was also faced by the Fourth Circuit in Arritt v. Grisell.80
The 40-year-old plaintiff in that case charged that a West Virginia stat-
ute setting an upper age limit of 35 for new applicants for certain police
forces in the state violated the ADEA.81 The district court entered
summary judgment for defendants, holding that the demands of public
safety and the safety of fellow officers justified the policy as a bfoq
under the standard set forth in Greyhound.8 2 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the Greyhound standard in favor of the "two-pronged
test" formulated in Tamiami.83 The court viewed the Greyhound test as
requiring the employer to demonstrate only "a minimal increase in risk
of harm, for it is enough to show that the elimination of the hiring
policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might other-
wise occur under the present hiring practice."8 This "minimal" bur-
den, the court held, was inappropriate.85 The proper standard was that
applied in Tamiami, requiring the employer to show first, that the bfoq
was "reasonably necessary to the essence of its business," and second,
78. The company's expert witnesses testified that age was a bfoq for test pilots, based on their
studies "reflecting the physiological and psychological changes that accompany the aging process
in the general population." Houghton himself, however, had been found to be in excellent condi-
tion, "even when compared to pilots and test pilots." In addition, there was evidence presented by
Hougton tending to show that aging occurs more slowly and to a lesser degree among test pilots.
Id. at 563-64.
79. Id. at 564. See note 73 supra for the progress of the Houghton case after this decision. In
accord with Houghton and Aaron is a recent decision from a district court in the Eighth Circuit,
EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Minn. 1980). The case involved a fire department
district chief who had been forced to retire at age 65, pursuant to a St. Paul ordinance and Minne-
sota law. His primary duties had been supervision, discipline, communication and training. Id. at
1137, 1139. While noting that the age limit might be lawful when applied to firefighters, the court
held that it was a violation of the ADEA when applied to those in positions such as district chief
who "retain sufficient strength and endurance to adequately perform their duties" beyond age 65.
Id. at 1145. In defining the defendant's burden of proof on the bfoq issue, the court relied on
Houghton. Id. at 1144.
80. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
81. The statute in question, W. VA. CODE § 8-14-12 (1976), established an 18 to 35 year age
limit for applicants for original appointment to the police force of any town with a population
over 10,000. Plaintiff had applied for appointment to the police force in Moundsville, West Vir-
ginia, which was covered by the statute. He was rejected because he was over the age limit. 567
F.2d at 1269.
82. 421 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. W. Va. 1976).
83. 567 F.2d at 1271.
84. Id. (citing Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975)).
85. 567 F.2d at 1271.
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that there was a factual basis supporting the hiring policy, or that it was
impractical or impossible to deal with persons over the age limit on an
individual basis.86 Since the district court had applied an improper
standard, summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded
to be considered under the Tamiami standard 87
Three recent district court decisions, each finding in favor of the
defendant on the bfoq issue, also align with Tamiami rather than Grey-
hound, although not expressly and not without some criticism of the
Tamiami rationale. In Murnane Y. Amercan Airlines, Inc. ,88 the court
upheld the airline's upper age limit for hiring new pilots. In doing so,
the court quoted language from both Greyhound and Tamiami,89 but
the decision seems to rest ultimately on the court's conclusions that
American had a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
pilots above age 40 when hired would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently 9° and that the age limit, as a means to assure the safety of
passengers, was essential to the defendant's business. 9' It thus appears
that the court applied the two-part Tamiami standard. In Tuohy v. Ford
Motor Co. ,92 the court held that the defendant's mandatory retirement
age of 60 for its private pilots was justified under the ADEA. 93 The
Tuohy court acknowledged that Greyhound "lumped all the parts of the
bfoq issue together," and that Tamiami separated the issues in an effort
"to define a neat test with which to solve every potential bfoq prob-
86. Id. On the issue of public safety, the Arrit court noted that, while Tamiami had made
this point relevant to the business-necessity question, it may be equally relevant to "the strictness
by which the efficacy of the age requirement and the practicality of individualized screening are to
be judged." Id. n.14.
87. Id. at 1271.
88. 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979). The 43-year-old plaintiff, a retired Navy and Coast
Guard pilot, applied for the position of ffight officer. The airline had an unwritten policy of hiring
only applicants 30-years-old or younger, and plaintiff's application was rejected.
89. Id. at 147.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Plaintiff, a pilot for defendant's Air Transportation
Office, was forced to retire at age 60, pursuant to company policy. Ford based its retirement
policy on the Federal Aviation Administration regulation mandating retirement of commercial
pilots at age 60. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980).
93. The court viewed the issue as whether the FAA regulation relied upon by defendant as
support for the retirement policy "in and of itself establishes a bfoq which permits defendant to
terminate pilots in its private air transportation system simply because they have reached the age
of 60." 490 F. Supp. at 260. The court held that the regulation did establish a bfoq and stated that
such a holding was necessary "in order to give proper deference to an administrative agency
which is much better equipped than is the court to handle issues concerning the safety of those
involved in domestic air traffic." Id.
It should be noted that the FAA regulation in question in Tuohy is used as an example of a
bfoq in the Department of Labor bulletin interpreting the ADEA. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(d)
(1980).
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lem.' ' 94 But the Tuohy court felt that the Tamiami standard needed
some refinement before it could be applied to the case before it, where
safety was a primary consideration. 95 However, the court essentially
took the approach of Tamiami, putting the bfoq defense to a two-part
test. Finally, in Beck v. Borough of Manheim,96 the court applied the
Tamiami rationale in upholding a mandatory retirement age for all
members of a small-town police force.
97
Thus, no court outside the Seventh Circuit has expressly adopted
the Greyhound rationale. Although Greyhound and Tamiami appear at
first to differ only slightly, it seems clear on closer reading that the
"two-pronged test" of Tamiami imposes a heavier burden on the de-
fendant asserting a bfoq and so is more in keeping with the spirit of the
ADEA.98 In both cases, the court required the defendant to show that
the asserted exemption was a matter of business necessity, as that stan-
dard was set forth in Diaz v. Pan American WorldAirways, Inc. 99 Fur-
ther, both courts required some justification beyond mere assumption
for the use of age as the determining factor in judging an individual's
fitness for the job in question, and the language used by the two courts
in this regard differs only slightly. Where the Greyhound court re-
quired "a rational basis in fact to believe" that eliminating the hiring
policy would increase the risk of harm to passengers,1°° the Tamiami
court called for "reasonable cause, that is, a factual basis for believing"
that all applicants over age 40 would prove to be unsafe drivers. '0' The
real difference between the two cases, however, is apparent in the way
in which the two courts applied the standards set forth. The Greyhound
court was ultimately satisfied with the defendant's "good faith belief'
in the necessity of its hiring policy, 02 suggesting a more subjective ap-
proach than the step-by-step analysis of the court in Tamiami.0 3 This
in turn suggests that the court in Greyhound was more easily satisfied
on the issue.
This suggestion was borne out in a recent Seventh Circuit case,
94. 490 F. Supp. at 261.
95. Id. at 262. For a discussion of the court's criticism of Tamiami, see note 194 infra.
96. 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Plaintiff was forced, by the terms of a town ordinance,
to retire from the town police force at age 60.
97. Id. at 925-27.
98. See note 10 supra.
99. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). See text accompanying notes
35-40 and notes 54-59 upra.
100. 499 F.2d at 863.
101. 531 F.2d at 236.
102. 499 F.2d at 865.
103. 531 F.2d at 235-36.
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EEOC v. City of Janesville,'°4 in which the court again indicated its
willingness to give a broader interpretation than that of other courts to
the bfoq exemption under the ADEA.
EEOC v CITY OF JTANES VILLE
Facts of the Case
Kenneth Jones was appointed chief of police of Janesville, Wis-
consin, in 1975. On June 30, 1979, nine days after his fifty-fifth birth-
day, he was forced to retire, 10 5 pursuant to a city policy that all
"protective service" employees, a category which includes all members
of the police force, must retire at the end of the calendar quarter during
which they reach age 55.106 The city's policy is patterned after the stat-
utory provisions of the Wisconsin Retirement Fund, 0 7 which creates a
retirement plan for all public employees in the state. The statute allows
compulsory retirement of employees participating in the fund on their
"normal retirement date,"' 0 8 and defines normal retirement for "pro-
tective occupation employees" as "the day on which such [employee]
attains the age of 55 years."' 109 Among protective occupation employ-
ees are "policemen, including the chief and all other officers.""l0
The city described the job of chief as calling for "responsible ad-
ministrative work directing all activities and employees of the City Po-
lice Department.""' The retirement policy, however, did not take into
account the demands of the particular position or the physical condi-
104. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
105. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (W.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d
1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
106. Id. It is possible under the city's policy for an employee who has reached the retirement
age to get an extension for one year if retirement would cause hardship for the employee or ad-
ministrative problems for the city. Jones had applied for such an extension, but it was denied. Id.
107. 6 Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 41 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980). "As a participant in the [fund], the
city pays the total cost of the retirement program for its police personnel and its contribution in
this case amounts to approximately twenty-five percent of Jones's annual salary." 630 F.2d at
1256.
108. 6 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 41.11(1) (West Supp. 1980).
109. Id. § 41.02(23).
110. Id. § 41.02(1 l)(a).
11. The complete description of the job requirements, as given by the district court, is as
follows:
[C]omprehensive knowledge of modem police administration, the rules and regulations
of the Police Department, police science, organization and operation, the use of police
records, and the standards by which the quality of police work is evaluated; an ability to
command the respect of officers, to supervise their work, to maintain effective relations
with the public and other city employees, to express ideas clearly orally and in writing,
and to prepare clear, accurate, comprehensive recommendations and reports; and good
physical condition.
480 F. Supp. at 1377.
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tion of the employee. Jones was forced to retire only because he had
reached age 55, without regard to the quality or demands of his
work. "12
District Court Opinion
The EEOC brought suit in Jones' name to enforce his rights under
the ADEA, t 13 and in advance of trial sought a preliminary injunction
to reinstate Jones pending the outcome of the trial on the merits. To
prevail on its motion, the EEOC of course had to demonstrate the like-
lihood of its success on the merits."
t4
Since the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of age discrimi-
nation," 5 the district court dealt with the motion by examining the
112. Id.
113. Jones originally filed suit in his own name, basing his claim on the ADEA, on 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, on U.S. CONST. art. IV, and on the equal protection provisions of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Pursuant to § 626(c)(1) of the ADEA, the EEOC elected to bring an
action to enforce Jones' rights under that act, thereby terminating his individual action based on
the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). However, the EEOC suit does not affect
Jones' actions based on §§ 1983 and 1985, article IV, and the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
480 F. Supp. at 1376 & n.l. For a review of the procedural aspects of the ADEA, see Sheeder,
supra note 62.
114. 480 F. Supp. at 1378. The court also noted that the EEOC was required to demonstrate
irreparable harm to Jones in the interim should interlocutory relief be denied. Id. at 1380. For
the district court's determination of this issue, see note 113 infra.
The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction under FED. R. Civ. P. 65 is a matter for
the court's discretion, and it is ordinarily determined by balancing four factors: 1) the likelihood
of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; 2) the balance between this
harm and the injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted; 3) the likelihood of plaintiffs
success on the merits; and 4) the public interest. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLEn, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 2948 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Since the court will
wei each factor, no single one will determine the issue, although the most important appears to
be the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. Id. Thus, even if plaintiff seems unlikely to
win on the merits, preliminary relief may still be granted where the balance of hardship tips
heavily in his favor. See, e.g., Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941
(9th Cir. 1972). See generaly Nussbaum, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunc-
tior--The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265 (1972).
The order to reinstate Jones was the second preliminary order sought in Janesville, the district
court having previously granted a temporary restraining order preventing the city from installing
Jones' successor. 480 F. Supp. at 1376.
115. The court simply stated its conclusion that the EEOC had set forth its prima facie case.
Id. at 1377.
One of the most controversial questions under the ADEA is what constitutes the plaintiff's
prima facie case. Where the employer plainly states that the basis of the employment decision was
the plaintiff's age, the question is an easy one. See Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972). But in most cases, the discrimination is less obvious. In these cases, the
plaintiff is generally required to demonstrate that he is a member of the protected group, that he
was qualified for the job in question, that he was discharged or refused employment, and that the
employer continued to seek or in fact hired someone with similar qualifications. See Marshall v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d
958 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prima facie case
of discrimination under Title VII). In addition, some courts have held that the person hired in
place of the plaintiff must be from outside the protected age group before a violation of the ADEA
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likelihood that the defendant would prevail on its affirmative defense.
The city asserted that its retirement policy came within the bfoq ex-
emption to the Act. In support of its assertion, the city argued that
since the primary function of the police department is the protection of
life and property, and since age is a valid criterion for employment in
light of the physical demands of this type of work, all employees of the
department could be subjected to the age requirement, regardless of
their particular duties. Thus, the chief, although not actively involved
every day in the duties of a patrolman, could be subjected to the same
age limit as a patrolman. The city further offered reports of the State of
Wisconsin Retirement Research Committee demonstrating that the
statutory plan on which the city's policy was based was an expression
of the good-faith judgment of the state legislature that public safety
demanded the retirement of all "protective service" employees at 55
years of age, regardless of their individual duties.
1 6
The district court considered, however, that to allow a bfoq ex-
emption on the grounds asserted by the city would go beyond the lan-
guage and intent of the ADEA." 7 Such a broad classification of
employees for the purpose of setting a mandatory retirement age, with-
out regard to the particular job of each member of the class, would
"deprive whole classes of older workers of the protection of the ADEA
if they worked in 'businesses' whose primary function could be said to
involve qualities associated with youth.""I8 The focus, the court held,
must be on the particular job in question, not on the primary function
of the police department: "At the threshold, defendant City must show
a relationship between being younger than fifty-five and the demands
of the chiefs job."'" 9
occurs. See Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981); Houser v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980). Other courts and the Department of Labor, how-
ever, have taken the view that it is enough if the plaintiff is replaced by someone younger, though
still within the protected class. See Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974);
Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979); 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1980). It
has been held that intent to discriminate on the part of the defendant is not an element of the
plaintiff's case. See Geler v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (not required that plaintiff show defendant's discriminatory intent to
establish violation of Title VII). Nor is it necessary that age be the only factor in the employer's
decision, as long as it is the determining factor. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979).
116. 480 F. Supp. at 1379-80.
117. Id. at 1379.
118. Id.
119. Id. In this respect, the court noted elsewhere:
[I]t is quite obvious that the effect of the ages of the department members upon the
normalcy or absence of normalcy in the operation of the department can be gauged only
by addressing precisely the particular activities of a particular employee or category of
employees (dispatchers, for example). The effect of the ages of all of the members of the
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The reports submitted by the city in support of its bfoq defense
failed to show any empirical basis for analyzing the relationship be-
tween age and a. particular "protective service" job. 20 At best, the
court said, they demonstrated that the legislature was not deliberately
discriminating against older workers, but had made its judgment on
mandatory retirement in good faith. 121 This, the court held, was insuf-
ficient. Since the city had submitted no evidence showing the relation-
ship between being younger than 55 and the demands of the chief's job,
it had failed to demonstrate the likelihood of its success on the issue at
trial.' 22 Therefore, the court held, the plaintiff was likely to prevail and
the injunction reinstating Jones was granted.
123
Seventh Circuit Opinion
The city appealed the order, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, dis-
solving the injunction. 24 While agreeing with the lower court that the
bfoq exemption is to be construed narrowly, the Seventh Circuit de-
clared that the lower court had given an excessively narrow reading to
the provision, especially in the context of a preliminary injunction pro-
ceeding. 25 The court also took exception to the district court's focus
on the demands of the chief's job. Dismissing the legislative history
relied upon in the opinion below, 26 the court declared that the plain
department... cannot be gauged by addressing only the particular activities of the
patrol officers.
Id. at 1378. In support of its view, the court cited the cases discussed above and the legislative
history of the ADEA. Id. at 1379.
120. Id. In fact, the court pointed out, one report suggested the arbitrary nature of the policy,
declaring that early retirement is less important in the case of administrative employees than for
other, more physically demanding positions. Id. at 1380.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court also found for the EEOC on the issue of irreparable harm to Jones. The
harm which the plaintiff (or Jones, in this case) claims he will suffer in the absence of the re-
quested preliminary relief is balanced against the harm the defendant might suffer should the
injunction be granted. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 114, § 2948. In this case, the court
held that the deterioration in Jones' morale and administrative skills pending the outcome of trial
outweighed the managerial difficulties his reinstatement would create for the city. The court char-
acterized the city's injury as self-inflicted. 480 F. Supp. at 1380-81.
124. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980). Along with the bfoq issue, the Seventh Circuit was faced
with the question of irreparable harm and a challenge to the ADEA on constitutional grounds.
Id. at 1256. (As to the irreparable harm issue, see note 135 infra.) The constitutional challenge,
asserting that the ADEA as applied to the states violated the reserved powers clause of the tenth
amendment, had been raised in the district court on a motion for reconsideration of the order
appealed from here. The motion had been denied. This constitutional issue was passed over by
the Seventh Circuit, since the issue had not been fully adjudicated below. 630 F.2d at 1259.
125. Id. at 1258.
126. Id. In the court's words, "our examination of the legislative history of the ADEA yields
no support for such a construction."
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meaning of the Act's language supported the city's argument.' 27 The
bfoq exemption could be applied in light of the employer's business as
a whole, and need not be viewed in terms of a particular occupation.
28
In the Seventh Circuit's view, the issue was not the relationship be-
tween age and the duties and demands of a particular "protective serv-
ice" job, but whether the city could establish "a BFOQ for the generic
class of employees subject to its retirement program."'
29
Having shifted the focus from the position of chief to the "busi-
ness" of the police department as a whole, the court then addressed the
legislative reports offered by the city in support of its defense. Conced-
ing that the reports contained no empirical analysis of the relationship
between age and any particular position, the court declared, however,
that such a showing was unnecessary. 130 The reports did show that the
legislature, in setting the retirement age, had acted in good faith out of
concern for public safety, not simply to discriminate against older
workers.' 31 Such a showing, the court held, was sufficient.
Further, the court placed some emphasis on the fact that the policy
in question was a legislative enactment, and it showed great deference
to the judgment of the legislature: "That the wisdom of a legislative act
is not subject to judicial scrutiny requires no citation."' 32 The state, in
creating the Wisconsin Retirement Fund, had created "a statutory pre-
sumption that age is a BFOQ for the class of protective service occupa-
tions covered."' 33
Thus, in the Seventh Circuit's view, the lower court had erred in
requiring the city to direct its bfoq defense to the position of chief, and
in requiring more evidence in support of the defense than had been
submitted. Therefore, the court held, since the exemption could be ap-
plied in this case and the city had ample evidence to support it, the city
did have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its asserted bfoq de-
127. Id. The court stated: "The district] court ascribed to the term 'particular business' a
meaning synonymous with the term 'particular occupation'. ... [Tihe plain meaning of the term
'particular business' is not susceptible to interpretation. That a particular occupation may by
definition be encompassed within the meaning of the term 'particular business' is irrelevant." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court distinguished Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), by stating: "Nor do we find reliance on our decision in
[Greyhound] to be dispositive because in that case a BFOQ was asserted to justify the mandatory
age-based retirement of a generic class of employees." Id. The issue in Greyhound, however, was
the validity of an employer's hiring policy. See notes 28-46 and accompanying text supra.
130. 630 F.2d at 1258.
131. Id. at 1258-59.
132. Id. at 1259.
133. Id.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
fense at trial. 3 4 This in turn meant that the EEOC was not entitled to
preliminary relief. 3 5 The lower court opinion was reversed and the
injunction dissolved.
ANALYSIS
EEOC v. City of Janesville indicates that the Seventh Circuit is
willing to depart even farther than it had in Greyhound from the nar-
row reading of the bfoq exemption adopted by other courts. It should
be remembered that the bfoq defense in Janesville was examined in the
context of a preliminary injunction proceeding, where the parties need
not satisfy the court on the merits of a claim or defense to the same
degree required at trial on the merits. 3 6 The parties must demonstrate
the "reasonable likelihood" of prevailing. In this case, since the
EEOC's prima facie case under the ADEA was easily made out, the
issue turned on whether the defendant would be able to rely on the
bfoq defense to defeat the claim. 137 It was necessary, therefore, for the
city to demonstrate the reasonable likelihood of its success on the bfoq
issue.'3 8 Thus, while the holding in Janesville does not mean that the
defendant had actually established that a bfoq applies in this case, it
does mean that in the court's view the defendant's evidence had
demonstrated the essential elements of the defense. 139
Three aspects of the opinion suggest that the court has construed
the exemption in a manner which goes beyond the intent of Congress
in providing for the bfoq exception: the court's refusal to focus on the
duties of the particular job in question; the court's suggestion that em-
pirical evidence is not needed to support an asserted bfoq; and the
court's ready acceptance of a "statutory presumption" that age is a bfoq
in this case.
134. Id.
135. Id. Since the granting of a preliminary injunction is determined by balancing the several
factors involved, the court also addressed the question of irreparable harm to Jones. See note 114
supra. The court held that the EEOC had failed to demonstrate that Jones would be irreparably
damaged in the absence of preliminary relief, finding nothing in the record to support the district
court's conclusion regarding the deterioration of Jones' skill and morale. Id. at 1259.
136. "The standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that he
is likely to prevail on the merits and that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable
injury." 630 F.2d at 1257. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 114, § 2948.
137. The district court framed the issue in these terms. 480 F. Supp. at 1378. The Seventh
Circuit accepted this view of the issue. 630 F.2d at 1257.
138. 480 F. Supp. at 1378.
139. See, e.g., 630 F.2d at 1258, where the court stated:
The [district] court concluded that the plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood of sustaining
its prma facie case in a trial on the merits because the City had failed to show by its
evidence a BFOQ for the position of police chief. It is this conclusion with which we
take exception.
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Particular Job or Primary Function?
The defendant in Janesville used a novel argument in support of
its bfoq defense. It urged the court to disregard the fact that the chief's
duties are different from those of employees carrying out the primary
function of the police department, the protection of life and prop-
erty. 140 The city argued that since age is a bfoq for those engaged in
the department's primary function, and since the chiefs job is closely
related to that primary function, age is a bfoq for the position of
chief.' 4' By the city's interpretation of the bfoq exemption, the focus is
not on the duties of the particular job involved, but on the primary
function of the employer's business.
Aside from noting that every previous case, including Greyhound,
had analyzed the bfoq issue in light of the duties of the particular
job, 42 the district court in Janesville pointed out the compelling reason
to reject the city's argument. The purpose of the ADEA is to require
that employment decisions affecting older workers be made not on the
basis of age, but by examining the abilities of the worker: an applicant
who can do the work cannot be rejected because of his age. 143 The
bfoq exemption allows the employer to use age limits in circumstances
where it is in fact necessary to be a certain age in order to qualify for
the occupation. This exemption is to be construed narrowly,'" how-
ever, and the more limited construction of the bfoq requires the em-
ployer to demonstrate that being a certain age is a necessary trait for
the particular job involved. To accept the broader interpretation urged
by the city in Janesville would "deprive whole classes of older workers
of the protection of the ADEA if they worked in 'businesses' whose
primary function could be said to involve qualities associated with
youth."145
The Seventh Circuit accepted the broader reading of the bfoq, for
which it found support in the "plain meaning" of the statutory lan-
140. 480 F. Supp. at 1378.
141. Id. at 1379. The city argued that the differences in the duties among particular jobs were
"marginal or extraordinary aspects" of the business of the department and should not affect the
court's analysis of the relationship between age and the primary function of the department. Id.
142. Id. The district court cited Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); and Aaron
v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
143. See note 3 supra for text of 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976); H.IL REp. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213; President's Message on
Older Americans, PuB. PAPERs 32 (Jan. 23, 1967).
144. See notes 10 & 23-24 supra.
145. 480 F. Supp. at 1379.
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guage. ' In the court's view, "Congress was certainly at liberty to limit
the applicability of a BFOQ to a 'particular occupation' rather than to
a 'business' if it so intended," but Congress chose not to do so, and thus
the district court's reading of the exemption was "excessively nar-
row."1 47 It appears, in fact, that this limitation is what Congress did
intend.
Although the Janesville court dismissed the legislative history of
the ADEA as yielding no support for the narrower construction,
48
there is some legislative comment which suggests that a narrow con-
struction is the proper reading. 49 Further, and more importantly, the
language of the statute itself suggests that the narrower construction is
the proper one. There are two elements to the bfoq exemption. First,
age must be a bona fide qualification, not for a particular business, but
for an occupation, a particular job. Then, as a second element, the
bfoq must be a matter of reasonable business necessity. This was the
reading of the Tamiami court in formulating its two-part burden of
proof which a defendant asserting a bfoq must satisfy.' 50 This also ap-
pears to be the view taken in the interpretative bulletins, which phrase
the question as whether "occupational qualifications will be deemed to
be 'bona fide' and 'reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business.' "-51 The first element, whether the "occupational
qualification" is "bona fide," requires the employer seeking to rely on a
bfoq to demonstrate that all persons above the age limit in question are
unable to carry out the duties of the job involved. 5 2 In other words,
146. 630 F.2d at 1258. See note 127 supra.
147. 630 F.2d at 1258.
148. Id. See note 126 supra.
149. One remark, made during discussion of the bfoq exemption, suggests that the narrower
interpretation was intended:
The committee intends to make clear that . . . an employer would not be required to
retain anyone who is not qualified to perform a particular job. For example. . . there
may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all employees above a specified age
would be unable to continue to perform safely and efficiently the duties of their particu-
lar jobs.
S. REP. No. 493,'95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 504, 513-14 (report on the 1978 amendments to the ADEA).
150. See notes 47-59 and accompanying text supra.
151. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1980); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 6, at 68,861.
152. Thus, in Tamami, the defendant was required to offer proof that all persons over 40
would prove to be unsafe drivers, or to demonstrate that there was no other practical manner,
apart from relying on age, to determine an applicant's unsafe propensities. Usery v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). Similarly, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), the Title VII case from which a part of the Tamami rationale
was drawn, the defendant was required to offer proof that all women were unable to perform the
duties of a switchman. In contrast, the Janesville court required no evidence that everyone over
age 55 would be unable to do the work of the chief of police, or even that Jones himself was no
longer able to do so.
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the employer must show that in light of the duties of the job in ques-
tion, the use of age as an indicator of fitness for the particular job is
justified. If the employer fails to satisfy this element, the second ele-
ment, the business-necessity question, is unimportant.
53
An additional reason for rejecting the city's argument in Janesville
is found in another section of the ADEA, section 623(a)(2), which
makes it unlawful for an employer "to . . . classify his employees in
any way which would deprive. . . any individual of employment op-
portunities. . . because of such individual's age."' 54 The city's policy
grouped all employees of the police department under the heading
"protective service occupations," setting a mandatory retirement age
without regard to the fact that a chief's duties are different from those
of a patrolman or dispatcher. 55 The city argued that since it could
demonstrate that some of its employees--the patrolmen who carry out
the primary "protective service" function-could be lawfully forced to
retire at a certain age,' 56 all members of the police force could be law-
fully retired at that age. 157 By accepting the argument, the Janesville
court permits the mandatory retirement of a group of employees based
solely on age, without regard to ability. The court ignores the fact that
the operation of a police department involves "a bundle of coordinated
activities,"' 5 8 each activity with its own duties and demands, some
153. The Tamiami court called this business-necessity element the "threshold burden," indi-
cating that the defendant must satisfy this part of the test first. 531 F.2d at 236. But since the
defendant must meet both parts of the two-part burden of proof set forth in that case, showing
business necessity alone will not suffice to justify an asserted bfoq.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1976).
155. 630 F.2d at 1256.
156. It does seem clear that for patrol officers a mandatory retirement age could be justified
under the ADEA. The legislative report referred to "particularly arduous types of law enforce-
ment activity" as an example in which an age limitation may be properly used. See note 149
supra. Courts have agreed. See, e.g., EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Minn.
1980) (retirement policy valid as to firefighters, though not when applied to district chiefs in ad-
ministrative positions); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(mandatory retirement of police officers held lawful in circumstances where inability of any one
officer to function effectively could have serious consequences).
157. 480 F. Supp. at 1379.
158. Id. at 1378. The district court characterized the operation of the police department as
"an organic relationship among component jobs which mesh together to yield law enforcement,"
requiring for effective operation the cooperation of all persons involved:
[P]olice officers on foot or in squad cars, patrolling the streets, sometimes chasing and
apprehending persons, sometimes controlling crowds, sometimes quieting boisterous
parties, sometimes resolving family quarrels, and so on; detectives engaged in interview-
ing or surveillance; telephone operators and dispatchers responding to and passing on
information; record keepers; and an executive supervising the whole range of activity.
1d.
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, declared that it was irrelevant that "a particular
occupation may by definition be encompassed within the... 'particular business."' 630 F.2d at
1258.
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more physically and psychologically taxing than others. The court sug-
gests that by grouping all these activities under the heading of "protec-
tive service occupations" these differences can be disregarded and all
employees can be made subject to the same retirement age. Yet this
classification of employees deprives some members of the department
of employment opportunities based solely upon age. The chief, though
perhaps less able to do the work of a patrolman when he reaches age
55, is not necessarily less capable as an administrator at age 60 than at
55 or 50; but, because he is a "protective service employee," he must
retire at age 55.159 This appears to be the type of practice that section
623(a)(2), 160 with its ban on classifications that adversely affect older
workers, was intended to prohibit.
Of course, a practice otherwise unlawful under section 623(a)(2),
like any other practice the ADEA prohibits, can fall within the bfoq
exemption in the proper circumstances.' 6' However, it is difficult to see
how Janesville presents a compelling case for the lawful use of such a
broad categorization of employees, given the variety of occupations in-
volved in the operation of a police department. 62 Unless the bfoq ex-
emption is to be construed without regard to the prohibitions of section
623(a)(2), the better approach, that of the district court in this case,163 is
to sort out the "bundle of coordinated activities" and examine the age
limitation in light of the duties of each particular "protective service
occupation."
It clearly seems to stretch the bfoq defense too far to suggest that
the bus company in Greyhound or Tamiami, having established the va-
lidity of its age limit for new drivers, 164 could now apply that same age
159. The district court pointed out in this case that the decision to retire Jones was based
simply on the fact that he had reached age 55, and no consideration had been given to the quality
of his work. 480 F. Supp. at 1377.
160. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1976).
161. Id. § 623(0(1) provides that "any action otherwise prohibited" by the ADEA is not un-
lawful where age is a bfoq.
162. See the district court's description of the "normal operation" of the police department,
480 F. Supp. at 1378, in note 158 supra. As the district court pointed out, use of the broad classifi-
cation "protective service employees" is inappropriate in this case, because "[tihe effect of the ages
of all of the members of the department upon the normalcy of the department's operation cannot
be gauged by addressing only the particular activities of the patrol officers." Id. It appears that
the use of such a classification would only be justifiable in a case where for each job within the
group there was some demonstrated relationship between age and the ability to perform.
163. Id. at 1379. As the court noted, this was also the approach of virtually all other courts
construing the bfoq, including the Greyhound court. For the cases cited in this respect by the
district court, see note 142 supra.
164. In both cases the defendant succeeded in establishing age as a bfoq for the occupation of
bus driver, so that upper age limits on hiring were held lawful. See the discussion of the cases in
the text accompanying notes 28-59 supra.
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limit to applicants for office jobs or other positions that do not involve
driving. To allow an exemption in that case would ignore the purpose
of the ADEA. Yet, if the bus company classified the positions involved
as "transportation occupations," since all the jobs involved are presum-
ably essential to the company's primary function of transporting pas-
sengers by bus, the rationale of the Janesville court would support such
an argument. Such a broad construction of the bfoq exemption, focus-
ing on the primary function of the employer's business rather than the
duties of the particular job in question, will allow the use of age as the
determining factor in the employment decision when in fact the job
applicant or employee may be fully able to meet the demands of the
job. This is precisely what the ADEA was intended to prevent. 165 The
narrower approach, more in keeping with the letter and spirit of the
ADEA, is to require the defendant to demonstrate that age is a valid
criterion for employment because of the nature of the particular job
involved in each case.
Empirical Evidence or Good Faith Judgment?
Even if the broad interpretation of the bfoq exemption is accepted,
it would still be possible for the asserted bfoq defense to fail. An em-
ployer invoking the exemption must demonstrate some basis beyond
mere stereotyping for the use of age as the determining factor in the
employment decision.' 66 The only evidence offered by the city in this
regard in Janesville was a series of legislative reports containing no em-
pirical evidence of the relationship between age and the ability to per-
form the duties of any "protective service occupation."167 In suggesting
that this was sufficient to justify the asserted bfoq defense, the Janes-
ville court underlined the basic difference between the Seventh Cir-
cuit's approach to the bfoq issue and that of other courts. ' 68
The district court in Janesville had rejected the legislative reports
as insufficient because they failed to analyze the specific demands of
individual jobs within the "protective services" classification in relation
to age.' 69 The reports not only failed to relate being younger than age
55 to the demands of the chief's job, but they apparently contained no
165. See note 3 supra for text of 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976).
166. See, e.g., Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 461 (E. D. Ark. 1977) (emphasis in original):
"[A]t no point will the law permit ... the fixing of a mandatory retirement age based entirely on
hunch, intuition, or stereotyping, i.e., without any empirical justification."
167. 630 F.2d at 1258.
168. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra.
169. 480 F. Supp. at 1379-80.
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data connecting age and any "protective service" position. 70 More-
over, in the district court's view, one report showed "the irrationality of
the current state classification. . . by noting that 'the necessity of early
retirement in the administrative position . . . is obviously of less con-
cern than in the case of the law enforcement officer.' ",171 The reports
did demonstrate, however, that the legislature had acted in good faith,
believing that the early retirement of all employees in the classification
was necessary in the interests of public safety. 172 The Seventh Circuit
declared this sufficient to sustain the city's defense.
173
The Janesville court here echoed the opinion in Greyhound, where
the court was ultimately satisfied that the defendant's age-based policy
rested on a good faith belief in its necessity for the safety of the com-
pany's passengers.174 As in Greyhound, the court indicated that only a
minimal showing that the age-based policy is not arbitrary or intention-
ally discriminatory is sufficient to justify a bfoq.
This standard is in sharp contrast to the narrower construction of
the exemption adopted by other courts. Tamiami and the courts fol-
lowing that decision imposed a much stiffer burden of proof on the
defendant, requiring empirical evidence that "all or substantially all"
members of the age group in question would be unable to perform the
duties of the particular job involved. 175 The Tamiami rationale, with
its two-part test, 176 makes the exemption more difficult to justify and
therefore less readily available to the defendant. If the bfoq exemption
is to be construed narrowly and have limited application, 177 the
Tamiami rationale is the better one.
If a bfoq exemption is allowed to be based only on the defendant's
good faith belief in its necessity, without requiring any empirical justifi-
cation for the age-based policy, the exemption will provide a loophole
170. Id. at 1380.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 630 F.2d at 1258-59. The Seventh Circuit also noted here that "but for the failure of the
City's evidence to address. . . the position of police chief, which we have determined was not
required, the district court was apparently willing to accept the statutory presumption that age is a
BFOQ" in this case. Id. at 1259. However, this is not so clear from the district court opinion,
which pointed out the absence of empirical evidence relating to any protective service position and
noted that the reports suggested the arbitrariness of the retirement policy. 480 F. Supp. at 1380.
174. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1122 (1975). The case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 28-46 and notes 99-103
supra.
175. See the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 47-87 supra.
176. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224,234-36 (5th Cir. 1976). See notes 47-59
and accompanying text supra.
177. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1979); Proposed Interpretations, supra note 6, at 68,861. See
also note 10 supra.
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which will allow a continuation of the arbitrary policies the ADEA was
intended to prevent. Although the Janesville court put some emphasis
on the fact that the city's retirement policy was not an act of deliberate
discrimination against older workers,178 the prohibitions of the Act are
not limited to intentional acts of discrimination. 79 Regardless of the
employer's intentions, any age-based policy which does not fall within
one of the ADEA's exceptions is unlawful.18 0 A refusal to hire because
of the age of the applicant, or a mandatory retirement policy, would
appear to be unlawful under the ADEA even though the employer is
acting in what he believes to be the best interests of the older worker,
unless the employer can demonstrate that age is an "occupational qual-
ification." It is possible that an employer might believe in all good
faith that anyone over age 55 is unable to do the work involved in a
particular job, or that public safety requires that all persons in a partic-
ular occupation be under a certain age, and yet be mistaken in this
belief.18 If it is the case that the employer is mistaken, and in fact
there is no relationship between age and the ability to do a particular
job, then the policy is the type of practice the ADEA was meant to
prohibit, since it is based on unfounded assumptions regarding age
rather than on an assessment of the older worker's ability.182 But by
the reasoning of Janesville and Greyhound,183 this good faith belief is
178. 630 F.2d at 1258.
179. Thus, it is stated that the Act is directed not only at arbitrary age-based employment
policies, but at "certain otherwise desirable practices which work to the disadvantage of older
workers." 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (1976). Further, that discriminatory impact alone is enough to
violate the ADEA is apparent in that the Act provides for additional damages where the violation
is shown to be unlawful. Id. § 626(b).
180. Title VII, similar to the ADEA in its language and purpose in prohibiting discrimination
based on race, sex, religion and national origin, has been construO in this manner. In Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court held that Title VII was directed at the conse-
quences of discriminatory employment policies, and that practices which were racially discrimina-
tory in impact, even though not intentionally so, were unlawful under the act.
This view, that it is the impact of the disputed policy and not the employer's intentions which
should be considered, has been taken by the court in an ADEA case. Geller v. Markham, 635
F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
181. For example, in EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (D. Minn. 1980), the
court pointed out:
mhe evidence introduced at trial does not establish that the traits of susceptibility to
heart attack and loss of strength and endurance preclude District Chiefs over the age of
64 from safely and efficiently performing their duties. To the contrary, the evidence
indicates that older, more experienced District Chiefs generally are better able than
younger, less experienced District Chiefs to determine the hazards at a fire scene and
direct fire fighting activities so as to avoid fire fighter injuries and fatalities.
The defendant in that case had argued that because of the decline in physical condition after age
64, older district chiefs were more prone to injuries and heart attacks themselves and were unable
to perform their jobs safely.
182. See note 3 supra.
183. The Greyhound court did find that the defendant's age limitation in that case was not
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sufficient to qualify the policy as a bfoq exemption. The exception,
applied in this manner, all but eliminates the rule.
This danger does not arise when the defendant is required to sup-
ply some empirical basis for the policy in question. The ADEA does
not insist that the employer hire an individual who is not qualified, 84
but it should be interpreted to require that the defendant have some
proof, other than the age of the individual, that the person is in fact not
qualified. It may be the case that all persons over a certain age are
unable to meet the demands of a particular job,' s5 and for this reason
the bfoq exemption is established. By demanding that there be some
objective proof that older workers are unqualified, as the court did in
Tamiami,186 the defendant will be unable to rely on an assumption
which, though firmly believed, is in fact unfounded.
There is one element of the city's argument which indicates that
the burden of justification should be somewhat reduced in this case-
the safety factor. The retirement policy challenged in Janesville was
instituted in the interests of the safety of the individual employees and
of the public. 87 Courts have generally agreed that where public safety
is the basis for the challenged age-based policy, there is some effect on
the defendant's burden of proof on the bfoq issue. In Tamiami, the
court regarded the safety factor as bearing on the business-necessity
element of the two-part test enunciated in that case.' 8 8 Thus, where the
defendant demonstrated that the purpose of the age limitation was to
assure the safety of its passsengers and other motorists, there could be
no doubt that the policy was necessary to the normal operation of the
defendant's business, since the normal operation of the business in-
volved the safe transportation of passengers by bus.' 89 But the defend-
ant still had to demonstrate that there were facts underlying the
assumptions on which the policy was based to satisfy the second ele-
ment of the test.'19 However, in Arritt v. Grisell,19' the court suggested
totally "lacking in objective reason or rationale," suggesting the court felt that it was presented
with something more than simply the defendant's belief in the necessity of the policy. 499 F.2d at
865.
184. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1978), which is quoted in part in
note 149 supra. See also the comment of the Tamiami court that the construction given the bfoq
in that case does not require an employer to hire an unqualified individual. 531 F.2d at 236.
185. See, e.g., the examples of bfoq exemptions given in 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1980), which are
described in note 25 supra.
186. See notes 47-59 and accompanying text supra.
187. 630 F.2d at 1258.
188. 531 F.2d at 235-36. See note 54 supra.
189. 531 F.2d at 236.
190. Id. Some language in the opinion suggests that even this burden eases somewhat when
safety is an issue. The court stated, when discussing the business-necessity element of the stan-
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that where public safety is involved, the overall burden on the defend-
ant to justify the policy should be reduced. 192 The Arritt court did not
elaborate, but it seems clear that, since the court in that case had re-
jected the "minimal increase in the risk of harm" standard of Grey-
hound,193 it did not mean to suggest that this minimal burden is
appropriate. But the court was apparently indicating that even the sec-
ond, factual-basis element of the Tamiami standard should be applied
less strictly where the defendant's policy is based on a concern for pub-
lic safety. 19
4
The safety factor should have some effect on the defendant's bur-
den of proof, and the ADEA should not require the defendant to exper-
iment with lives or property in order to gather the data in support of its
age-based employment policy. 195 But the defendant's simple assertion
dard, that "[tihe greater the safety factor... the more stringent may be the job qualifications."
Id. Later in the opinion, the court declared that where safety is an issue, "the employer must be
afforded substantial discretion in selecting specific standards which, if they err at all, should err on
the side of preservation of life and limb." Id. at 238. Accord, Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc.,
482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979).
191. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
192. Id. at 1271 n.14.
193. The question inArril was whether Greyhound or Tamiami presented the better standard.
The court chose Tamiami. See the discussion of the case in the text accompanying notes 80-87
supra.
194. In Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1980), the court took the view
that the Tamiami test became less workable as the importance of the safety factor increased. De-
fendant argued in Tuohy that its 60-year retirement age for its private pilots was a bfoq because of
the high risks involved in the job. Under Tamiami, the safety factor is considered only as part of
the business-necessity element. See text accompanying note 188 supra. The Tuohy court noted
that since safety concerns play no part in the determination of the second, factual-basis element,
"[tihe court would treat this question [the plaintiff's ability to perform the job safely and effi-
ciently] as it would any other where experts testify on both sides, and it would permit the fact
finder to make the ultimate decision." 490 F. Supp. at 262. But a decision in favor of the plaintiff
which turned out to be incorrect could have "catastrophic results." Id. The court considered the
Tamiami approach too inflexible, since it would be applied in the same manner in cases, like the
one before it, where the safety factor was "enormous" and in cases where the risks involved were
not nearly as great. Id. at 263. A better approach in the opinion of the Tuohy court would apply a
test of reasonableness to the age-based policy, determining the "proper amount of leeway" to be
given an employer on a case-by-case basis. Id. The court ultimately sustained the bfoq defense
on the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
See Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979), another pilot case,
in which the airline argued that its upper age limit for new pilots was a bfoq. While apparently
applying the Tamiami standard to test the validity of the defense, the court stated that "American
should be able to apply a reasonable general rule in order to minimize the risks of the disastrous
consequences of an airline accident." Id. at 147.
195. The Greyhound court used this reasoning in rejecting the Weeks standard as too strict.
499 F.2d at 865. Recent decisions have echoed this rationale. Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 490 F.
Supp. 258, 262 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("If the court were to prohibit the defendant from terminating
the plaintiff, and if it then turned out that the defendant's experts had been right, many people
might lose their lives."); Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135, 147 (D.D.C. 1979)
("In some cases, the individual's interest in being free of employment discrimination on account
of age must give way to the societal interest in having the safest air transportation system possi-
ble.").
NOTES AND COMMENTS
that a concern for public safety underlies the challenged policy should
not alone be sufficient to create a presumption that the policy is justi-
fied.196 The Janesville court seems to have taken this view, however, in
showing such deference to the judgment of the Wisconsin legislature.
As with its acceptance of a good faith judgment in place of some empir-
ical proof,197 the court opens the way by this interpretation for the use
of the bfoq exemption as a means to evade the purposes of the ADEA.
A better view would require the defendant, where public safety is a
concern, to make some showing that the age limitation in question in
fact serves to assure the safety of those to be protected and that the
assumptions underlying the policy--that those over a certain age are
unable to perform the job safely-have some basis in fact.
The Statutory Presumption of a BFOQ
The Janesville court showed added deference to the defendant's
good faith judgment in this case because the judgment was embodied
in a state statute: 198 "That the wisdom of a legislative act is not subject
to judicial scrutiny requires no citation."1 99 It may be that the court
was reluctant, on the basis of the limited evidence presented at a pre-
liminary injunction proceeding, to examine the validity of Wisconsin's
retirement plan for public employees.2°° But the opinion suggests, es-
pecially in the language quoted above, that because the policy is found
in a statute, it is less subject to scrutiny under the ADEA than a similar
practice of a private employer.
Since the 1974 amendments, the ADEA has included within its
definition of employer "a State or political subdivision of a State."
'20'
196. See note 68 supra for language of the court in Aaron.
197. See text accompanying notes 166-86 supra.
198. The city's policy was drawn from Wisconsin's statutory retirement plan for public em-
ployees. 6 Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 41 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980).
199. 630 F.2d at 1259.
200. The court criticized the lower court opinion:
It is true, as the district court properly observed, that an exemption to a remedial statute
must be narrowly construed, but in our judgment, especially in the context of a prelimi-
nary injunction proceeding, the district court's construction of the exemption provided in
Section 623(0(1) of the ADEA is excessively narrow.
Id. at 1258.
201. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976)). Those portions of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1974 which extended minimum wage and overtime requirements to the states were challenged
on tenth amendment grounds in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and were
held unconstitutional under the reserved powers clause. However, the sections of the act amend-
ing the ADEA, and specifically the section making the ADEA applicable to the states, were not at
issue in that case. Several defendants in ADEA cases have argued that National League of Cities
also invalidates these provisions, but the courts have held as to the ADEA that the act is a valid
exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267,
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There is no suggestion in the ADEA itself, or in its legislative history,
that the Act was meant to be applied differently when the defendant is
the state rather than a private employer.202 Nor have other courts
taken this view. A city ordinance 203 and a state statute2° 4 mandating
the retirement of fire chiefs, and a state law setting an upper age limit
for applicants to police forces in the state,205 have all been asserted as
bfoq exemptions, and each has been held subject to the same standard
of justification as the age-based policies of private employers.
While the interpretative bulletins do not address this issue under
the ADEA, the EEOC has issued guidelines with respect to state laws
claimed as bfoq exemptions in sex discrimination suits under Title VII.
Title VII recognizes that for some jobs sex may be a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification,2°6 and in several cases it has been argued that be-
cause a state law bars women from certain occupations, ostensibly to
protect them, this is enough to qualify the ban as a bfoq under the
Act.20 7 But the EEOC's guidelines take a contrary view: state laws
which "do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abili-
ties of individual females, and, therefore, discriminate on the basis of
sex,. . . will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established
unlawful practice or as a basis for the application of the [bfoq] exemp-
1269-71 (4th Cir. 1977); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The defendant
in Janesrville also raised this argument on appeal, but it was not addressed by the court. 630 F.2d
at 1259. For a discussion of the ADEA issues raised by National League of Cities, see Note, The
Constitutionality ofthe ADE4 after Usery, 30 ARK. L. REV. 363 (1976) (commenting on Aaron);
Note, National League of Cities v. Usery. Its Implicationsfor the Equal Pay Act and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239 (1977).
202. H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2811, 2850, commenting on the amendments, states: "The committee expects that ex-
panded coverage under the Age Discrimination in Employment law will remove discriminatory
barriers against employment of older workers in government jobs ... as it has and continues to
do in private employment."
203. Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D: Ark. 1976). See text accompanying notes 62-72
supra.
204. EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Minn. 1981). See note 79 supra.
205. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 80-87 supra.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(e) (1976).
207. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Alabama law barring women from
those "correctional counselor" positions requiring close contact with male inmates); Kober v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973) (state law setting maximum weekly hours
for women); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd,
612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (state law barring women from upper
ranks of correctional facility staff); Manley v. Mobile County, 441 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977)
(sheriffs department regulation barring women from guard positions in all-male jail); Mitchell v.
Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1976) (school board ban on pregnant women in
teaching positions); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell TeL & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971),
aff'd, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) (state law setting maximum daily
and weekly hours for women); Jones Metal Prods. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 281 N.E.2d I
(1972) (statutory ban on women in certain occupations).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion.''208 There is no presumption that a practice is lawful simply be-
cause it is embodied in a statute. Thus, in those cases where the
statutory ban on women has been asserted as a bfoq, the defendant has
been required to supply some justification for the practice beyond the
fact that it has the legislature's stamp of approval. Where no other
justification sufficient to sustain the practice has been offered, the stat-
ute has been struck down.
2°9
The deference shown by the Janesville court to the legislative judg-
ment that age is a bfoq for "protective service" employees, therefore, is
inappropriate. The ADEA, by including the states within the definition
of employers, intends that state laws and practices which have a dis-
criminatory impact on older workers be subjected to the same scrutiny
as similar practices of private employers.
CONCLUSION
The immediate effect of EEOC v. City of Janesville, it appears, will
be that the city will prevail at trial on its bfoq defense and Jones will be
denied relief under the ADEA. 210 A decision on a motion for prelimi-
nary relief is binding only with respect to the issues and facts presented
at the hearing on the motion, and it is possible that the outcome may
change after the issues are fully tried.21' But the broad interpretation
of the bfoq exemption given by the court in Janesville indicates that the
city has demonstrated all the necessary elements of the defense as far as
the court is concerned. It will be difficult for the EEOC to rebut the
city's case.
More generally, the Janesville decision suggests that the Seventh
Circuit is willing to go far to uphold an employer's assertion of a bfoq
208. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1) (1980).
209. See, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); Gunther v.
Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 426 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Manley v. Mobile County, 441 F. Supp. 1351 (S.D. Ala. 1977);
Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 415 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1976); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
990 (1972); Jones Metal Prods. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 281 N.E.2d 1 (1972).
But see Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1980), an ADEA case in
which the defendant supported its practice of retiring its private pilots at age 60 by citing the
Federal Aviation Administration regulations setting age 60 as the upper limit for commercial
airline pilots. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1980). The court, viewing the issue as "whether or not 14
C.F.R. 121.383(c) in and of itself establishes a bfoq," answered in the affirmative, "in order to give
proper deference to an administrative agency which is much better equipped than is the court to
handle issues concerning the safety of those involved. . . and in order to avoid a needless dupli-
cation of effort." 490 F. Supp. at 260.
210. However, Jones' claims based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, U.S. CONST. art. IV, and
the fifth and fourteenth amendments remain unaffected. See note 113 supra.
211. See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 114, § 2950.
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in an age discrimination case. This deference to an employer's judg-
ment on the relationship between age and the ability to perform is
questionable in light of the ADEA's express purposes of eliminating
age-based stereotyping and of promoting the employment of older
workers based on their abilities. The court's insistence on focusing on
the primary function of the employer's business, rather than on the par-
ticular job in question, gives a further advantage to the employer. By
the rationale of Janesville, the way is opened for the widespread use of
the bfoq exemption where an employer's business is one which prima-
rily must employ younger workers. Such a broad interpretation of the
bfoq is not in accord with the spirit of the ADEA.
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